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12 results for "qualia"

K_1_14 Credible Consciousness

K_1_14 — Qualia: The Subjective Experience Problem

Qualia (singular: quale) — the term used in philosophy of mind for the subjective, experiential properties of conscious mental states — the redness of red, the painfulness of pain, the taste of coffee, the felt quality o

qualia subjective experience hard problem phenomenal consciousness Mary's Room what-it-is-like
P_1_12 Verified Philosophy & Meaning

P_1_12 — Philosophy of Perception: Qualia, Illusion, and Direct Realism

The philosophy of perception investigates the nature, objects, and epistemological status of perceptual experience — asking what we are aware of when we see, hear, touch, taste, or smell the world, and how perceptual exp

philosophy of perception qualia phenomenal consciousness illusion hallucination direct realism
K_5_11 Credible Consciousness

K_5_11 — Synaesthesia and Consciousness: Cross-Modal Binding

Synaesthesia (British spelling; "synesthesia" in American English) is a neurological condition in which stimulation of one sensory or cognitive pathway automatically triggers an involuntary experience in a second, unstim

synaesthesia synesthesia cross-modal grapheme-color sound-color chromesthesia
P_1_19 Credible Philosophy & Meaning

P_1_19 — Philosophy of Mind

The philosophy of mind is the branch of philosophy that investigates the nature of mental phenomena — consciousness, intentionality, perception, emotion, belief, desire, and their relationship to the physical body and br

philosophy of mind consciousness mind-body problem qualia hard problem Chalmers
K_1_17 Verified Consciousness

K_1_17 — Integrated Information Theory: Phi, Axioms & Empirical Tests

Integrated Information Theory (IIT), developed primarily by Giulio Tononi (University of Wisconsin–Madison) from 2004 to the present, proposes that consciousness is identical to integrated information — a quantity denote

integrated-information-theory iit phi giulio-tononi consciousness-axioms qualia-space
K_1_09 Consciousness

K_1_09 — Philosophical Zombies and the Hard Problem

The philosophical zombie (p-zombie) thought experiment, formalized by David Chalmers (1996), asks: Could there exist a being physically and functionally identical to a conscious human — identical atom for atom, processin

philosophical zombie p-zombie hard problem of consciousness David Chalmers explanatory gap qualia
K_5_05 Credible Consciousness

K_5_05 — Consciousness and Information Integration: Phi and Its Critics

Integrated Information Theory (IIT), developed primarily by neuroscientist Giulio Tononi (b. 1960) at the University of Wisconsin-Madison, with significant contributions from Christof Koch (Allen Institute for Brain Scie

integrated information theory IIT phi Tononi Koch consciousness
K_5_01 Consciousness

K_5_01 — Neurophenomenology and First-Person Science

Neurophenomenology — the research program proposed by Francisco Varela (1996) — seeks to bridge the "explanatory gap" between objective neuroscience and subjective experience by integrating rigorous first-person phenomen

neurophenomenology first-person methods Francisco Varela phenomenology Husserl lived experience
ZD_1_17 Credible Information & Computation

ZD_1_17 — Integrated Information Theory

Integrated Information Theory (IIT) is a mathematical theory of consciousness developed by Giulio Tononi (University of Wisconsin-Madison, 2004; IIT 3.0, 2014; IIT 4.0, 2022) that attempts to explain what consciousness i

integrated-information-theory iit consciousness phi giulio-tononi qualia
P_1_03 Philosophy & Meaning

P_1_03 — Panpsychism and Modern Philosophy of Mind

Panpsychism — the view that consciousness or experience is a fundamental and ubiquitous feature of reality — has undergone a dramatic revival in academic philosophy over the past two decades. Once dismissed as primitive

panpsychism panprotopsychism IIT Tononi Chalmers combination problem
P_1_01 Philosophy & Meaning

P_1_01 — The Hard Problem of Consciousness

The Hard Problem of Consciousness, defined by philosopher David Chalmers in 1995, asks: Why does physical processing in the brain give rise to subjective experience? We can explain HOW neurons fire (the "easy problems")

consciousness hard problem qualia explanatory gap Chalmers panpsychism
P_1_08 Philosophy & Meaning

P_1_08 — Philosophy of Mind and the Body Problem

The mind-body problem — how do mental states (thoughts, feelings, consciousness) relate to physical states (neurons, brains, bodies)? — is one of the oldest and most intractable problems in philosophy. Descartes (1641) f

philosophy of mind mind-body problem dualism Descartes physicalism materialism